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Preservation of
Material Evidence in California:
Does Hitch Survive Trombetta?
Introduction
In 1974, the California Supreme Court held in People v. HitchI that
due process required law enforcement agencies to establish policies to
preserve material evidence for the use of defendants in criminal prosecu-
tions. When law enforcement intentionally but nonmaliciously has de-
stroyed evidence, the court must determine whether it was material and,
if so, whether the government agency involved has established, enforced,
and attempted in good faith to adhere to rigorous and systematic proce-
dures to preserve the evidence.2 The court will find a due process viola-
tion when the evidence is material and the prosecution fails to show that
the government had established, enforced, and made a good faith effort
to adhere to procedures for preservation. If a court finds a due process
violation, it must exclude any evidence based on or derived from the de-
stroyed or lost evidence.3
In Hitch, a county crime lab destroyed the breathalyzer breath sam-
ple collected by the police and used to analyze the defendant's blood-
alcohol content in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated (DWI).'
The Hitch rule soon became established in California as the due process
standard against which intentional, nonmalicious destruction of evidence
would be measured in all criminal prosecutionsi Under Hitch, the pros-
ecution has a duty to preserve and disclose evidence material on the issue
of the defendant's guilt or innocence.' To establish the materiality of
evidence no longer in existence, a defendant need show only a reasonable
possibility the evidence would have been favorable on the issue of guilt or
1. 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974).
2. Id. at 647-53, 527 P.2d at 365-69, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 13-17.
3. Id. No due process violation occurs if (1) the evidence is not material or (2) the
evidence is material but the prosecution has shown that the government had established, en-
forced, and made a good faith effort to adhere to procedures for its preservation. Id.
4. Id. at 644-45, 527 P.2d at 363, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
5. See People v. Nation, 26 Cal. 3d 169, 175-76, 604 P.2d 1051, 1054, 161 Cal. Rptr. 299,
302 (1980), discussed infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
6. 12 Cal. 3d at 649-50, 527 P.2d at 367, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 15. "'The duty of disclosure is
operative as a duty of preservation.' "Id. at 650, 527 P.2d at 367, 117 Cal. Rptr. 15 (quoting
United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (italics deleted)).
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innocence.7
The Hitch court did not specify whether its holding was based on
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution. Since
Hitch, two events have cast doubt on the continued viability of its due
process analysis under either constitution. First, in 1982 the people of
California passed Proposition 8, which in part amended the California
Constitution to eliminate independent state grounds as a basis for exclud-
ing evidence in criminal prosecutions."
Second, in 1984 the United States Supreme Court decided California
v. Trombetta.9 Four years earlier in People v. Trombetta, ' a California
Court of Appeal in reviewing a DWI conviction had extended the Hitch
preservation duty to breath samples collected in the intoxilyzer. Relying
heavily on Hitch, which it characterized as implementing a federal due
process standard, the Court of Appeal held that when a law enforcement
agency collects evidence with the intoxilyzer or any breath testing device,
it must establish and follow rigorous and systematic procedures to pre-
serve the captured evidence or its equivalent for the defendant."
Upon petition by the California Attorney General, the United States
Supreme Court reversed Trombetta, holding that the failure of law en-
forcement personnel to preserve a breath sample for the defendant does
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 12 The
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the prosecution to
preserve only "constitutionally material" evidence. 3 The standard of
constitutional materiality in Trombetta differs significantly from the stan-
dard articulated in Hitch.
Because the Court of Appeal had relied exclusively on the Hitch
materiality standard,' 4 the Supreme Court's reversal of Trombetta poses
serious questions about the continued validity of Hitch. This Note ana-
lyzes the effect of Trombetta on Hitch. First, it examines the due process
analysis in Hitch, focusing on the "reasonable possibility" standard of
materiality for lost or destroyed evidence. It then describes the impor-
tant role of Hitch in California criminal procedure. Second, the Note
analyzes the Trombetta decision, closely scrutinizing its standard of
"constitutional materiality." Third, the Note compares the Hitch and
7. 12 Cal. 3d at 649, 527 P.2d at 367, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
8. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
9. 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984).
10. 142 Cal. App. 3d 138, 190 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1983). In Trombetta, the defendants'
blood-alcohol content was tested by the intoxilyzer, a device which does not produce a preserv-
able breath sample. The breathalyzer used in Hitch does produce a preservable breath sample.
See infra note 17.
11. Id. at 144, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
12. 104 S. Ct. at 2535.
13. Id. at 2534.
14. 142 Cal. App. 3d at 143, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
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Trombetta standards. The Note concludes that Hitch is no longer valid
law because Trombetta in effect overruled Hitch to the extent it relied on
the Fourteenth Amendment, and because Proposition 8 overruled Hitch
to the extent it had relied on the California Due Process Clause.
I. People v. Hitch
In People v. Hitch,15 the California Supreme Court established the
prosecutorial duty to preserve and disclose material evidence in Califor-
nia. Warner Hitch was arrested for driving while under the influence of
alcohol. 6 He submitted to a breathalyzer test, which registered his
blood-alcohol content at 0.20%.17 After the test, the arresting officer
15. 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974). For law review commentary on
Hitch, see Johnson, The Supreme Court of California, 1975-76, Foreword: The Accidental
Decision and How It Happens, 65 CAL. L. REv. 231, 234-38 (1977); Note, The Right to In-
dependent Testing: A New Hitch in the Preservation of Evidence Doctrine, 75 COLUM. L. REv.
1355 (1975); Comment, The Prosecution's Duty to Preserve Evidence Before Trial, 72 CAL. L.
REv. 1019 (1984); Comment, Breathalyzers: Should the State Be Required to Preserve the
Ampoules? 15 LAND & WATER L. REv. 299 (1980).
16. 12 Cal. 3d at 644, 527 P.2d at 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 11. Under California law, it is
unlawful for any person to drive while under the influence of alcohol or with a blood-alcohol
content of 0.10 percent or more. CAL. VEI. CODE § 23152 (West 1985). These are separate
offenses. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152(a), (b) (West 1985). Any person who drives a vehicle in
California is deemed to have consented to a chemical analysis to determine the alcohol content
of his blood. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23157(a)(1) (West Supp. 1986). If arrested, the driver may
choose analysis of his blood, breath, or urine. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353(b) (West Supp.
1986). The testing methods must be approved by the California Department of Health Serv-
ices. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 436.52 (West Supp. 1986), CAL. ADMIN. CODE. tit.
17, R. 75, §§ 1220-1222.2. Failure to submit to one of the tests results in an automatic six-
month suspension of the driver's license. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353(a) (West Supp. 1986).
Retestable samples of blood and urine must be preserved. CAL. VEH. CODE § 22157.5 (West
Supp. 1986). Until 1974, law enforcement agencies had no duty to preserve retestable breath
samples. Hitch established the requirement that breath samples must be preserved when the
analysis is performed on the breathalyzer.
17. 12 Cal. 3d at 644, 527 P.2d at 363, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 11. The breathalyzer was the
prevailing method of breath analysis until the mid-1970s. Brief for Petitioner at 6 n.6, Califor-
nia v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2530 n.1 (1984). The breathalyzer captures a breath sample
in a glass ampoule containing exactly three cubic centimeters of a chemical solution. If alcohol
is present, it changes the color and translucence of the solution. A beam of light is cast
through the solution, and the relative light transmissibility of the solution is registered on a
meter which calculates the percentage of alcohol in the blood. 12 Cal. 3d at 644, 527 P.2d at
363, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 11. The correlation between the test ampoule and a reference ampoule
provides the reading.
At the time of Hitch, law enforcement agencies were replacing the breathalyzer with the
intoxilyzer. Brief for Petitioner at 6 n.6, California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984). The
intoxilyzer is now the prevailing method of breath analysis in California. Id. The intoxilyzer
captures a breath sample in a chamber within the machine. Infrared light is used to sense the
alcohol content. The breath sample is not preserved. The chamber is purged with clean air
before a breath sample is taken. Two samples of breath are analyzed. The results of the tests,
plus the analyses of clean air samples, are printed on a card. The two breath samples must
register within 0.02% of each other to be admissible in court. The machine is calibrated
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poured the contents of the test ampoule into a bottle, discarded the
empty ampoule, and delivered the bottle to the county crime laboratory,
which eventually disposed of its contents. The actions of the officer and
crime laboratory were in accord with established procedures. 18
Before trial Hitch moved to suppress the results of the breathalyzer
test on the ground that destruction of the test ampoule and its contents
had deprived him of due process. The trial court sustained the motion
and dismissed the prosecution. 19 The California Supreme Court granted
a hearing.
20
The Hitch court examined four separate issues: (1) whether inten-
tional but nonmalicious destruction of material evidence by the prosecu-
tion violates due process," (2) what principles should govern the
determination whether lost or destroyed evidence is material and
favorable to a defendant,22 (3) whether sanctions should be imposed for
the destruction or loss,23 and (4) what sanctions would be appropriate.24
weekly and the calibration results, as well as a portion of the calibration samples, are available
to the defendant. People v. Trombetta, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 141, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
A third breath testing device, the intoximeter, has been approved for use in California but
is not widely used. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, R. 75, §§ 1220-1221.5, Brief for Petitioner at 6
n.6, California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 2528. Approved for use with the intoximeter is the
field-crimper indium tube encapsulation kit. A breath sample can be captured with the kit in
the field and brought to the intoximeter for testing. 142 Cal. App. 3d at 142, 190 Cal. Rptr. at
321.
18. 12 Cal. 3d at 644-45, 527 P.2d at 363, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
19. The trial court determined that it would have been possible to retest the chemical
change that had occurred in the contents of the ampoule. It concluded that preservation of the
test ampoule would have provided:
information of value to both the prosecution and the defense; that the intentional but
nonmalicious destruction of these items deprived defendant of due process of law by
making valuable evidence unavailable; that [California] Vehicle Code section 13354
required preservation of such items, that the results of the breathalyzer test should be
suppressed and that the action should be dismissed pursuant to [California] Penal
Code section 1385.
12 Cal. 3d at 645, 527 P.2d at 364, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 12. The trial court and the Supreme
Court were operating under a scientific misconception. Although the breath samples are pre-
servable, they were not considered to be retestable when Hitch was decided. "'[A]t the present
time, a scientifically valid procedure is not known to be available for the reexamination of a
breathalyzer ampoule.'" Comment, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. at 304-05 (quoting from
JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCE, July 7, 1978 at 432). See also Thornton, Uses and Abuses of
Forensic Science, 69 A.B.A. J. 288, 292 (1983).
20. 12 Cal. 3d at 645 n.2, 527 P.2d at 364 n.2, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 12 n.2:
The Appellate Department of the Superior Court of Ventura County reversed the
judgment of dismissal. Upon certification by that court that a transfer of the case to
the Court of Appeal appeared necessary to secure uniformity of decision and to settle
important questions of law, the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, ordered
said case transferred to it for hearing and decision... Division One of said Court of
Appeal reversed the judgment of dismissal and remanded the cause to the municipal
court for trial. We granted a hearing in this court.
21. 12 Cal. 3d at 647-648, 527 P.2d at 365-66, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
22. Id. at 648, 527 P.2d at 366, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
23. Id. at 650, 527 P.2d at 367-68, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 15-16.
rVol. 13:147
PRESERVATION OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE
Only the second issue is relevant to the development of the reasonable
possiblity standard of materiality of lost or destroyed evidence.
25
A. A Reasonable Possibility: The Hitch Materiality Standard
Hitch required the court to consider the appropriate standards for
determining the materiality of lost or destroyed evidence. This was an
issue of first impression in California. The Hitch court commenced its
analysis by reviewing cases in which the prosecution had intentionally
withheld evidence from the defense.26
To determine the materiality of intentionally withheld evidence, a
reviewing court should "examine the suppressed evidence, decide
whether or not it [is] favorable to the accused and ultimately ... deter-
mine whether or not it [is] material by 'look[ing] to the entire record...
in light of the circumstances ... consider[ing] not only the other evi-
dence of guilt but also any other defense evidence.' "27 As the Hitch
court noted, however, the intentionally withheld evidence was available
for examination on appeal in the cases to which it looked for guidance.
By contrast, in Hitch the evidence no longer existed. Accordingly, the
court had to determine:
[B]y what principles a court should determine a defendant's claim
for relief where ... the evidence subject to disclosure is no longer
in existence and the court is therefore. unable to ascertain whether
such evidence was, or would have been, favorable to the defendant
and material on the issue of his guilt or innocence.28
24. Id. at 650-52, 527 P.2d at 367-69, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 15-17.
25. The court resolved the other three issues by determining first that the intentional,
nonmalicious destruction of evidence can violate due process if the court finds the evidence to
have been material and the prosecution had failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it. Id. at
647, 650, 527 P.2d at 365, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 13, 16. Sanctions should be invoked when good
faith destruction of the evidence is found to have violated due process. Id. at 654, 527 P.2d at
371, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 19. The appropriate sanction is exclusion of prosecution evidence based
on or derived from the destroyed evidence. Id. at 655, 527 P.2d at 371, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
In the Hitch setting, exclusion of the breathalyzer test results was the appropriate sanction.
Another example is exclusion of a police report based on notes that have been lost or de-
stroyed. See People v. Goss, 109 Cal. App. 3d 443, 167 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1980), discussed infra
notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
26. 12 Cal. 3d at 645, 527 P.2d at 364, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 12. In these cases "the settled
rule [is] that the intentional suppression of material evidence favorable to a defendant who has
requested it constitutes a violation of due process, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the
prosecution." Id. (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1971); Brady v. Mary-
land, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); and In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 532, 487 P.2d 1234, 1238, 96
Cal. Rptr. 594, 598 (1971)). Even in cases where the defendant has not made a specific discov-
ery request, the prosecution's suppression of material evidence favorable to the accused could
violate due process. 12 Cal. 3d at 646-47, 527 P.2d at 365, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
27. 12 Cal. 3d at 647, 527 P.2d at 365, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 13 (quoting In re Ferguson, 5
Cal. 3d 525, 533, 487 P.2d 1234, 1240, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594, 600 (1971).
28. Id. at 648, 527 P.2d at 366, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
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In addressing this issue, the Hitch court looked to "another but cog-
nate context" 29 in which the prosecution fails or refuses to disclose the
identity of an informer. 30 In these cases, as in the case of lost or de-
stroyed evidence, the materiality of the informer's testimony cannot be
established by examining its probable impact on the trial result.
31
Recognizing the impossibility of showing that the unknown in-
former would be a material and favorable witness, the court had not re-
quired the defendant to prove that the informer would give favorable
testimony or was a participant in, or eyewitness to, the crime.32 The
court required the defendant to show only that "in view of the evidence
the informer would be a material witness on the issue of guilt and nondis-
closure of his identity would deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
'33
That burden would be discharged "when [the] defendant demonstrates a
reasonable possibility that the anonymous informant.., could give evi-
dence on the issue of guilt which might result in defendant's
exoneration.
34
Finding nondisclosure of an informer's identity closely analogous to
the loss or destruction of evidence,35 the court applied the reasonable
29. Id.
30. In the California informer decisions, which derived ultimately from Roviaro v. United
States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), the court had applied the following rule: "[w]hen it appears from
the evidence that an informer is a material witness on the issue of the defendant's guilt, the
informer's identity may be helpful to the defendant and nondisclosure would deprive him of a
fair trial." Price v. Superior Court, I Cal. 3d 836, 842, 463 P.2d 721, 724-25, 83 Cal. Rptr. 369,
372-73 (1970).
Generally, the California informer cases involved arrests and convictions for narcotics
violations, in which the unidentified informer had cooperated with the police by setting up or
participating in narcotics transactions which led to the defendants' arrests, People v. Mc-
Shann, 50 Cal. 2d 802, 330 P.2d 33 (1958), which were suspected by the defendants of having
played such a role, People v. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 401 P.2d 934, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1965), or
in which the informers had provided incriminating information about the defendants which
led to their arrest, Honore v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 162, 449 P.2d 169, 74 Cal. Rptr. 233
(1969).
The California informer cases on which the Hitch court relied were People v. Hunt, 4 Cal.
3d 231, 481 P.2d 205, 93 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1971); Price v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 836, 463
P.2d 721, 83 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1970); Honore v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 162, 449 P.2d 169, 74
Cal. Rptr. 233 (1969); and People v. McShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802, 330 P.2d 33 (1958). Other
informer cases important in the development of the reasonable possibility standard were Peo-
ple v. Garcia, 67 Cal. 2d 830, 434 P.2d 366, 64 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1967); People v. Perez, 62 Cal.
2d 769, 401 P.2d 934, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1965); People v. Williams, 51 Cal. 2d 355, 333 P.2d
19 (1958); and People v. Castiel, 153 Cal. App. 2d 653, 315 P.2d 79 (1957).
31. 12 Cal. 3d at 647-48, 527 P.2d at 366, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
32. Honore v. Superior Ct., 70 Cal. 2d 162, 168, 449 P.2d 169, 172-73, 74 Cal. Rptr. 233,
236-37 (1969).
33. 70 Cal. 2d at 168, 449 P.2d at 172-73, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37 (quoting People v.
Garcia, 67 Cal. 2d 830, 839-40, 434 P.2d 266, 64 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1967)).
34. 12 Cal. 3d at 648-49, 527 P.2d at 366, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 14 (quoting Price v. Superior
Ct., 1 Cal. 3d 836, 843, 463 P.2d 721, 725, 83 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373 (1970)).
35. 12 Cal. 3d at 649, 527 P.2d at 367, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
possibility standard to the materiality determination in Hitch. The court
stated: "If, given the availability of the test ampoule and its contents,
and the reference ampoule, there is a reasonable possibility that they
would constitute favorable evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence,
then such evidence must be disclosed [and preserved]." 36 The Hitch court
held that the destroyed evidence was material because there was a rea-
sonable possibility that it would impeach the accuracy and credibility of
the breathalyzer test results.3 7
The court did not refine or limit the reasonable possibility standard
in transferring it from the undisclosed informer context to the unavaila-
ble evidence context. This may mean simply that the Hitch court in-
tended the reasonable possibility standard be liberally construed when
applied to unavailable evidence. However, if the Hitch court did not in-
tend a liberal construction of the standard, its analysis appears faulty
because it fails to account for the distinctions between the cases of un-
known informers and unavailable evidence. For example, it is much
more likely that an undisclosed informer, if available, would give
favorable testimony than it is that destroyed physical evidence, if avail-
able, would be favorable. This is particularly true when the physical evi-
dence has already yielded inculpatory evidence, as the breath samples
had in Hitch. But "[n]o one knows what the undisclosed informer...
might testify. He might contradict or persuasively explain away the pros-
ecution's evidence."38 The informer might "vindicate the innocence of
the accused or lessen the risk of false testimony"39 or amplify prosecution
testimony. The informer might disclose an entrapment or confirm the
defendant's testimony.' Nondisclosure of the informer's identity to a
great extent deprives the defendant of the opportunity to challenge evi-
dence offered against him.4
By contrast, there is little likelihood that lost or destroyed physical
evidence, if available, would produce favorable evidence when it has pro-
duced unfavorable evidence already. The purposes for which lost or de-
stroyed evidence is sought are limited. If such evidence were available, its
use typically would be limited to disputing comparable specific evidence
offered by the prosecution. For example, when the prosecution has intro-
duced results of scientific analysis, such as analyses of breath, blood, or
semen samples, availability of a sample for independent analysis by the
defendant would be useful only for attacking the accuracy of the results
36. Id.
37. Id.; but see supra note 19.
38. People v. Castiel, 153 Cal. App, 2d at 659, 315 P.2d at 82.
39. People v. MeShann, 50 Cal. 2d at 808, 330 P.2d at 36.
40. People v. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d at 773, 401 P.2d at 936, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
41. 50 Cal. 2d at 808, 330 P.2d at 36.
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of the prosecution's analysis.42 As another example, the availability of a
police officer's notes that have been destroyed after the information they
contained has been transferred to a police report would serve the limited
purpose of impeaching the accuracy of the report or the credibility of the
police officer. In neither of these situations would the unavailability of
the evidence deprive the defendant of the opportunity to challenge the
evidence offered by the prosecution. With scientific analysis, the defend-
ant still may attack the general accuracy of the analytic device or
method, or he may impugn the accuracy of the specific test results of-
fered by the prosecution by attempting to show machine or operator er-
ror or extraneous interference with the test.43 With police notes, the
defendant still may resort to traditional methods of impeaching the of-
ficer's credibility. Loss or destruction of physical evidence does not de-
prive the defendant of the opportunity of producing evidence which
might result in his exoneration;' other means of producing such evi-
dence are usually available.45
If the Hitch court had intended to restrict the reasonable possibility
standard in the lost evidence context, it might have directed courts to
ascertain the existence of a reasonable possibility by reference to the to-
tality of the circumstances in each case.4 6 For example, when all of the
evidence linking the defendant to the crime is weak, and the lost or de-
stroyed evidence, if available, could conclusively exclude as possible sus-
pects a large majority of the population group of which the defendant is a
member, there exists a reasonable possibility that the evidence would
have been favorable on the issue of guilt or innocence.47 However, when
the evidence offered by the prosecution is very strong in the totality of
circumstances, the possibility that the lost evidence, if available, would
have been favorable becomes much less "reasonable. ' 4 The fact that the
Hitch court chose not to restrict the reasonable possibility standard in
any way suggests that it should be applied liberally.
42. In the case of scientific analysis, as the reliability and accuracy of a particular method
or device increases, the likelihood that preserved evidence would be exculpatory decreases. See
Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. at 2534 n.10.
43. See, e.g., id. at 2535.
44. In the informer context, it has been noted that "[i]t is the deprival of the defendants of
the opportunity of producing evidence which might result in their exoneration which consti-
tutes the error .. " People v. Castiel, 153 Cal. App. 2d at 659, 315 P.2d at 82 (emphasis in
original).
45. See 104 S. Ct. at 2535.
46. This is essentially what the court did eight years later in People %'. Hogan, 31 Cal. 3d
815, 647 P.2d 93, 183 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1982). See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
47. See People v. Nation, 26 Cal. 3d 169, 604 P.2d 1051, 161 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1980).
48. See People v. Hogan, 31 Cal. 3d 815, 647 P.2d 93, 183 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1982).
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B. Application of the Hitch Standard in California
The California Supreme Court has applied the Hitch materiality
standard in a variety of cases involving lost or destroyed evidence, in-
cluding a semen sample,49 fingernail scrapings,50 police notes,51 and a
urine sample. 2 Consistent with the apparent intention of the Hitch
court, the court generally has accorded a liberal construction to the rea-
sonable possibility standard.
In People v. Nation,53 the court held that the prosecution must not
only retain material evidence but also take reasonable measures to pre-
serve it.5 4 In Nation, a semen sample had been retained but had deterio-
rated because it had not been refrigerated. The court found a
reasonable possibility that analysis of the semen sample not only might
have impeached the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses but also
might have exonerated the defendant. 6
In People v. Hogan,57 the court rejected the appellant's contention
that Hitch imposed a duty on the prosecution to obtain scrapings from
the fingernails of a murder victim. 8 In reaching its holding, the Hogan
court departed from the liberal application of the Hitch standard and
determined the reasonable possibility question in light of all of the evi-
dence, rather than on the sole basis of the unavailable evidence. "Con-
sidering the totality of circumstances," the court found it "highly
implausible that the scrapings could have produced favorable evidence
on the issue of guilt."5 9
49. People v. Nation, 26 Cal. 3d 169, 604 P.2d 1051, 161 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1980).
50. People v. Hogan, 31 Cal. 3d 815, 647 P.2d 93, 183 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1982).
51. People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981).
52. People v. Moore, 34 Cal. 3d 215, 666 P.2d 419, 193 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1983).
53. 26 Cal. 3d 169, 604 P.2d 1051, 161 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1980).
54. Id. at 177, 604 P.2d at 1055, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
55. The conviction was not reversed on this ground, however, because the state had deliv-
ered the sample to the defense at its request. Because the defense had neither delivered the
sample to a laboratory for analysis nor taken measures to preserve it, it could not be stated that
the state's inaction had caused the deterioration. Id. at 177, 604 P.2d at 1055, 161 Cal. Rptr.
at 303. The reversal was based on the court's finding that Nation had been denied effective
assistance of counsel because his trial attorney had failed to object to impermissibly suggestive
pretrial identifications. Id. at 181-82, 604 P.2d at 1058, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
56. Id. at 176 n.2, 604 P.2d at 1055 n.2, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 303 n.2.
57. 31 Cal. 3d 815, 647 P.2d 93, 183 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1982).
58. Summarizing its holdings in Hitch and Nation, the Hogan court stated that the prose-
cution was under a duty to preserve evidence already obtained. However, "[n]either case im-
posed a duty to obtain such evidence or to conduct any particular tests." Id. at 851, 647 P.2d
at 114, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 838. The prosecution cannot be expected to gather all evidence that
might eventually prove useful to the defense. However, "It]here might be cases in which this
court would impose sanctions for a failure to obtain evidence." Id. The court did not elabo-
rate on the circumstances that might lead it to impose sanctions.
59. Id.
Fall 19851 PRESERVATION OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE
156 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 13:147
In People v. Murtishaw6 ° a police officer had destroyed his handwrit-
ten notes of an unrecorded interrogation of the defendant. Although the
Hitch issue was not dispositive of the case, the court found a close resem-
blance between the officer's destruction of the notes and the destruction
of the breath sample in Hitch.61 The court reasoned that, just as Hitch
was "effectively precluded ... from verifying the accuracy of [the test]
results,"6 in Murtishaw, the destruction of the notes and the failure to
record the interrogation "made it impossible for the defense to verify
whether the typed transcript reflects the handwritten notes or the reality
of the interrogation.
'63
In People v. Moore, I the defendant had been convicted of narcotics
violations. He was granted probation on condition that he submit to pe-
riodic narcotics testing. Moore supplied a urine sample for analysis.
Three separate tests indicated the presence of PCP. Based on these tests,
the probation department requested a probation hearing. At the hearing
Moore's counsel requested the urine sample, which was the only evidence
of the alleged probation violation. The sample had been discarded.
5
The court held that a urine sample which had yielded traces of narcotics
should have been preserved because "there exists a reasonable possibility
that independent testing of the urine sample in this case could yield re-
sults that would undermine the prosecution's case. "66
In People v. Goss, 6 7 a decision of the Court of Appeal a tape record-
60. 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981).
61. Id. at 755, 631 P.2d at 458, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 34 Cal. 3d 215, 666 P.2d 419, 193 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1983).
65. Id. at 218-19, 666 P.2d at 420, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
66. Id. at 221, 666 P.2d at 421, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
67. 109 Cal. App. 3d 443, 167 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1980). The Hitch materiality standard has
been applied to evidence in a variety of California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal cases.
People v. Goss was selected by the author not because it is of particular importance but because
of the nature of the evidence to which the Hitch standard was applied. In People v. Zamora,
28 Cal. 3d 88, 615 P.2d 1361, 167 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1980), the Supreme Court applied the
standard to police records of unsustained citizen complaints of racial prejudice and excessive
use of force against officers who arrested the defendant. The records had been destroyed before
the defendant was arrested pursuant to a city council resolution approving destruction of vari-
ous city records. The Supreme Court found that the defendant had met the Hitch standard.
The following cases are samples of the Court of Appeal's application of the Hitch standard. In
People v. Brown, 138 Cal. App. 3d 832, 188 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1982), stolen bathrobes found in
defendant's possession were returned to the store from which they were stolen and sold before
trial. The defendant did not meet his burden under Hitch. In People v. Hunt, 133 Cal. App.
3d 543, 184 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1982), a police officer destroyed a list of vehicle license plate
numbers he made at the scene of a crime. The defendant failed to show a reasonable possibility
that the list would have constituted favorable evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence. In
People v. Bailes, 129 Cal. App. 3d 265, 180 Cal. Rptr. 792, (1982), a prosecution for burglary,
the prosecution lost photographs of a window screen to the burgled house. A fingerprint con-
clusively established as belonging to the defendant was found on the screen. The defendant
PRESERVATION OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE
ing of a conversation between the defendant and a police officer was
erased inadvertently. After learning of the erasure, the officer prepared a
supplemental report.6" The defendant denied having made specific in-
criminating statements attributed to him in the report and moved to sup-
press the officer's testimony.69 The Court of Appeal found a reasonable
possibility the tapes could have impeached the officer's account of the
incriminating statements. The court asserted that the defendant's denial
of the admissions attributed to him in the report established the tape's
materiality because there was "a reasonable possibility that the tape
could have impeached the officer's account of appellant's statement.
70
The California Supreme Court in Hitch apparently intended the rea-
sonable possibility standard to be interpreted liberally. California courts
have indeed interpreted the Hitch standard liberally in applying it to
cases involving lost or destroyed material evidence. Under Hitch, courts
for the most part have applied the reasonable possibility standard in a
vacuum, without regard to the totality of the circumstances in each case.
II. The Impact of Proposition 8
In June 1982, the California electorate adopted Proposition 8, the
so-called Victim's Bill of Rights, as an amendment to the California Con-
stitution.71 Included in Proposition 8 was a provision entitled the "Right
to Truth-in-Evidence," now Article I, section 28(d) of the Constitution.
Section 28(d), which severely limits the use of the exclusionary rule in
California, reads as follows:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds
vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant
evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, includ-
failed to meet his burden under Hitch. In People v. Ammons, 103 Cal. App. 3d 20, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 772 (1980), tape recordings of communications between a police dispatcher and an of-
ficer in the field were erased. In People v. Swearingen, 84 Cal. App. 3d 570, 148 Cal. Rptr. 755
(1978), police officers stopped a van for driving without a front license plate. One officer saw a
vial containing marijuana on the floor of the van. Searching the van, the officers discovered a
bag of marijuana and in the defendant's house they discovered hashish. The vial was lost while
in police possession. The defendant alleged that the vial was opaque and the officer could not
have recognized its contents. If the defendant's allegations were true, the subsequent searches
were illegal and the evidence inadmissible. The court found that the defendant had shown a
reasonable possibility that the lost evidence would have been favorable on the issue of guilt or
innocence. In People v. Vera, 62 Cal. App. 3d 293, 132 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1976), a prosecution
for burglary and burning of a public building, the defendant's fingerprints were found on a
deep fat fryer inside the building. Latent fingerprints were lifted from the fryer and placed on
a card. The defendant argued that the police officers should have preserved the fingerprints in
place on the fryer or should have photographed it while the fingerprints were still on it or
should have preserved the fryer itself. The defendant failed to meet his burden under Hitch.
68. 109 Cal. App. 3d at 450, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
69. Id. at 451, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
70. Id. at 454-55, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
71. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
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ing pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any
trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard
in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any
existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay,
or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this sec-
tion shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the
press.72
By its terms, the Truth-in-Evidence provision eliminated independ-
ent state grounds as a basis for excluding evidence in criminal trials. The
only exceptions are those expressly or impliedly excepted in the provision
itself. "The effect of [Article I, section 28(d)] was, inter alia, to require
the courts of this state to look to federal law in deciding issues concern-
ing the exclusion of evidence."
'73
After the initiative was adopted, the California Attorney General
distributed a guide to Proposition 8 in which it asserted that "[u]nless
Hitch can be based on federal due process, Proposition 8 abolishes its
sanction [of exclusion of evidence]."' 74 In In re Lance W., the Califor-
72. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 28(d). Evidence Code section 352 grants trial courts discretion
to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will unduly consume time, or create substantial danger of undue prejudice, confus-
ing the issues, or misleading the jury. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
Evidence Code section 782 relates to the admissibility of evidence of the sexual conduct of
the complaining witness in rape cases to attack the witness' credibility. CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 782 (West Supp. 1986).
Evidence Code section 1103 relates to the admissibility of evidence of the character of a
victim of a crime to prove that the conduct of the victim was in conformity with his character.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103 (West Supp. 1986).
73. People v. Tierce, 165 Cal. App. 3d 256, 262, 211 Cal. Rptr. 325, 328-29 (1985).
74. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDE TO PROPOSITION 8: VICTIMS' BILL OF RIGHTS, 4-48
(June 9, 1982). The elimination of independent state grounds was anticipated before Proposi-
tion 8 was adopted. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ANALYSIS OF PROP-
OSITION 8, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, 14-15 (March 24, 1982).
The California Supreme Court has rendered several decisions in w hich it has construed
section 28(d). In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985) held
that section 28(d) eliminated the exclusionary rule as a remedy for searches and seizures that
violate article I, section 13 of the California Constitution but do not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 890, 694 P.2d at 754-55, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 642. The court also held that
section 28(d) eliminated California's vicarious exclusionary rule. Id. at 887, 694 P.2d at 752,
210 Cal. Rptr. at 659. People v. Smith, 34 Cal. 3d 251, 667 P.2d 149, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692
(1983), held that section 28(d) applies only in trials for offenses committed after the effective
date of Proposition 8 which was June 9, 1982. Id. at 262, 667 P.2d at 154, 193 Cal. Rptr. at
697. People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985), held that
section 28(d) did not abrogate a trial court's discretion to exclude evidence of prior convictions
under California Evidence Code section 352. Id. at 306, 696 P.2d at 117, 211 Cal. Rptr. at
725. Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 802, 693 P.2d 789, 210 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1985),
held that the express exception from section 28(d) for statutory rules of evidence related to
privileges includes the immunity from use at trial of any statements made by a minor in a
hearing to determine fitness to be tried in juvenile court or statements made to a probation
officer. In Ramona R., the court quoted Evidence Code section 940: "To the extent that such
privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person
PRESERVATION OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE
nia Supreme Court interpreted Proposition 8 as having eliminated the
remedy for certain violations of rights afforded by the California Consti-
tution, but not as having made such violations "constitutional."76
What Proposition 8 does is to eliminate a judicially created remedy
for violations of the search and seizure provisions of the federal or
state Constitutions, through the exclusion of evidence so obtained,
except to the extent that exclusion remains federally compelled
The people have apparently decided that the exclusion of evi-
dence is not an acceptable means of implementing [substantive
fights protected by the state constitution]. '
If the court is correct in asserting that Proposition 8 eliminated the rem-
edy, but not the right which the remedy was designed to enforce, it may
be said that a defendant's right to evidence found to be material under
Hitch still exists, but that his ability to enforce his right through exclu-
sion of evidence based on or derived from the lost evidence has been
eliminated. Pragmatically, however, the Hitch right is illusory if no rem-
edy exists to enforce it.
IH. California v. Trombetta
In People v. Trombetta,78 a California Court of Appeal applied Hitch
in a DWI prosecution in which the defendants' breath had been tested by
the intoxilyzer.79 The intoxilyzer, unlike the breathalyzer used in Hitch,
has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him." Id. at 808,
693 P.2d at 793, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 208. It appears from this decision that any privilege against
self incrimination provided by the California Constitution that is additional to the privilege
extended by the Fifth Amendment will survive Proposition 8 as an independent state ground
for the exclusion of evidence.
75. 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985).
76. In Lance W., the defendant moved to suppress prosecution evidence obtained through
an illegal search of a vehicle owned and occupied by another person. Id. at 880-81, 694 P.2d at
248,210 Cal. Rptr. at 635. The court found that Proposition 8 had eliminated the independent
state grounds on which California's vicarious exclusionary rule was based and had prohibited
exclusion of evidence obtained in violations of the California Constitution's search and seizure
provision, article I, section 13. 37 Cal. 3d at 885-90, 694 P.2d at 751-55, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 638-
42. Therefore, the defendant's only protections were to be found in the Fourth Amendment.
Under the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the de-
fendant in Lance W. had no standing to object to the evidence illegally seized from the vehicle.
In addition, the search of the defendant's person did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id.
at 881-84, 694 P.2d at 748-50, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 636-37. Accordingly, the court held that the
evidence was admissible. Id. at 896, 694 P.2d at 759, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
77. Id. at 886-87, 694 P.2d at 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
78. 142 Cal. App. 3d 138, 190 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1983).
79. In People v. Miller, 52 Cal. App. 3d 666, 125 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1975), the court ad-
dressed whether Hitch should be applied to the intoxilyzer. In Miller the court refused to
interpret Hitch as requiring law enforcement to preserve all evidence that can be reduced to
preservable form. Id. at 669, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 342. "Hitch considered only the breathalyzer.
That device produces test material which can be retested if preserved. The intoxilyzer, how-
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does not preserve breath samples; it holds samples only long enough to
measure the suspect's blood-alcohol content.8" Apparently relying on
Hitch's assertion that breath samples constitute material evidence in
DWI prosecutions,81 the Trombetta court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment82 requires law enforcement agencies to preserve intoxilyzer
breath samples for DWI defendants.83 In reaching its decision, the
Trombetta court did not expressly apply the Hitch materiality standard
to the unavailable breath samples.84 As a result, the defendants were
relieved of a significant portion of their burden under Hitch.
The Trombetta defendants contended that under Hitch "the failure
of law enforcement personnel to capture and preserve a retestable breath
sample violated due process and rendered the intoxilyzer results inadmis-
sible."85 The Court of Appeal agreed, reasoning that "a taking [by the
intoxilyzer] is the collection of evidence within the Hitch rationale."86
The court concluded that "[d]ue process demands simply that where evi-
dence is collected by the state, as it is with the intoxilyzer, or any other
breath testing device, law enforcement agencies must establish and follow
rigorous and systematic procedures to preserve the captured evidence or
its equivalent for the use of the defendant."87
ever, produces no such material." Id. at 668, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 342. Miller interpreted Hitch
as holding that the prosecution must preserve only evidence that comes into its possession at
some time. "The test by intoxilyzer ... may have 'gathered' evidence in the sense of placing
the breath sample in the chamber, but it was not evidence of which the government could 'take
possession.'" Id. at 669-70, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (quoting United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d
642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
80. See supra note 17.
81. 142 Cal. App. 3d at 143, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 322. See Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d at 647, 527 P.2d
at 365, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
82. 142 Cal. App. 3d at 143, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 322. "Since the Hiich rule implements a
federal due process standard, it is unaffected by California Constitution, article I, section 28,
subdivision (d)." Id. (citations omitted). See supra note 74 and accompanying text. See infra
note 127.
83. 142 Cal. App. 3d at 144, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
84. Id. at 143, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
85. Id. at 142, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
86. Id. at 143-44, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
87. Id. at 144, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 323. The Court of Appeal endorsed the following lan-
guage from a Colorado Supreme Court decision: "The failure of the state to collect and pre-
serve evidence, when those acts can be accomplished as a mere incident to a procedure
routinely performed by state agents, is tantamount to suppression of that evidence." Id. (quot-
ing Garcia v. District Court, 197 Colo. 38, 46, 589 P.2d 924, 929-30 (1979)). The Court of
Appeal was "persuaded that the reasoning of the Colorado court- paralleling the Hitch ra-
tionale-is sound and that the same result should prevail in California." 142 Cal. App. 3d at
144, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 323. The Court of Appeal's endorsement of the Garcia reasoning sup-
ports the conclusion that implicit in the Trombetta holding is an affirmative duty on law en-
forcement to collect evidence for the use of the defendant in non-DWI prosecutions. Although
the United States Supreme Court foreclosed such a duty under the Fourteenth Amendment in
California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. at 2534, such an affirmative duty has recently been urged
upon the California Supreme Court by Chief Justice Bird in her dissent in In re Michael L., 39
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A. The Supreme Court's Decision
The California Court of Appeal's failure to apply the Hitch materi-
ality standard, as well as its assertion that Hitch implemented a federal
due process standard,8 8 invited review of Trombetta by the United States
Supreme Court. 9 After the California Supreme Court denied the peti-
tion for hearing,9" the California Attorney General obtained a writ of
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.91
The Court initiated its analysis in Trombetta by noting that the due
process requirement of fundamental fairness in criminal prosecutions had
led it to develop "'what might loosely be called the area of constitution-
ally guaranteed access to evidence.' "92 Due process requires the prosecu-
tion to report to the defendant and the trial court whenever a
government witness lies under oath;93 to turn over exculpatory evidence
that would raise a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt even in
the absence of a specific discovery request;94 to reveal the contents of plea
agreements with key government witnesses;95 and, in some circum-
stances, to disclose the identity of undercover informants who possess
evidence critical to the defense. 96 A defendant also has a constitutionally
protected right to request and obtain evidence material to guilt or rele-
vant to punishment.97 However, the Court had "never squarely ad-
Cal. 3d 81, 702 P.2d 222, 216 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1985). In Michael L., the police left a videotape
of a store robbery with the store owner at the owner's request. The videotape was subse-
quently erased. The defendant sought to exclude evidence concerning the viewings of the
videotape before its destruction as well as any evidence that might have been derived from
them, including in-court identifications of the defendant. The Supreme Court found exclusion
of the evidence to be "unwarranted even under our pre-Trombetta authority." Id. at 86, 702
P.2d at 225, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 143. The court declined to state whether Hitch survived
Trombetta. Id. The Chief Justice criticized the majority for "declin[ing] to protect the integ-
rity of [the Hitch] truth-finding process by failing to recognize a duty to seize [material] evi-
dence [as defined in Hitch]." Id. at 90, 702 P.2d at 227, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
88. See infra note 127.
89. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
[When... a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to
be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any
possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as
the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case in the way it did
because it believed that federal law required it to do so.
Id. at 1040-41.
90. People v. Trombetta, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 145, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
91. 464 U.S. 1037 (1984).
92. 104 S. Ct. at 2532 (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867
(1982)).
93. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-72 (1959).
94. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976).
95. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972).
96. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-62 (1957).
97. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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dressed the Government's duty to take affirmative steps to preserve
evidence on behalf of criminal defendants."98
The Court began this inquiry in Trombetta by examining its decision
on a related issue in Killian v. United States.99 In Killian, an FBI agent
destroyed his notes of a conversation with the petitioner after he had
transferred the information they contained to his investigative report. In
contrast to the claim in Trombetta that the destroyed evidence could
have aided the defendant's case by impeaching the intoxilyzer test re-
sults,1" Killian argued only that the reports did not contain all of the
evidence the notes had contained, so that the amount of evidence avail-
able to him had been diminished. 101 The Court remanded the action for
a determination of whether the evidence had, in fact, been lost.10 2 In
dicta, however, the Court remarked that if the notes were made only for
the purpose of transferring their data to reports, and that transfer had
been made,10 3 destruction of the notes in good faith and in accord with
established procedures would not violate due process.
w0
The Court found Killian analogous to the issue in Trombetta. Just as
the purpose of the notes in Killian was providing information for the
investigative report, the purpose of the breath sample in Trombetta was
providing raw data to the intoxilyzer; just as the agent's notes had been
sought in Killian to impeach the report, the breath samples in Trombetta
were sought to impeach the intoxilyzer results.10 5
The Court then turned from Killian and, examining other prece-
dents, concluded that the state's actions in Trombetta did not violate due
process. 106 First, the Court reasoned that the failure to preserve the
breath samples was not the result of "official animus towards respondents
or of a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence." ' 107 Relying on
Killian, the Court found that the California authorities were acting "'in
good faith and in accord with their normal practices.' "108
Second, the Court found no constitutional defect in California's pol-
icy of not preserving breath samples.109 For this proposition, the Court
relied on its opinion in United States v. Agurs. I" In Agurs, the defendant
was convicted of second-degree murder in the stabbing death of a male
98. 104 S. Ct. at 2533.
99. 368 U.S. 231 (1961).
100. 104 S. Ct. at 2531.
101. 368 U.S. at 241-42.
102. Id. at 242.
103. The reports were in existence at the time of trial. Id. at 241.
104. Id. at 242.
105. 104 S. Ct. at 2533-34.
106. Id. at 2534.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Killian, 368 U.S. at 242).
109. 104 S. Ct. at 2534.
110. 427 U.S. 97 (1976)
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companion after a brief interlude in a motel room. Agurs argued that
she had acted in self-defense after the victim had attacked her with a
knife. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecu-
tion's failure to provide defense counsel with certain background infor-
mation about the victim, which would have tended to establish his
violent character, deprived Agurs of a fair trial11' under Brady v.
Maryland.
1 12
The Agurs Court noted that "[t]he mere possibility that an item of
undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have
affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the
constitutional sense.""' 3 The proper standard of materiality must reflect
the overriding concern that the defendant's guilt has been established be-
yond a reasonable doubt." 4
[I]f the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not
otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed. This
means that the omission must be evaluated in the context of the
entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether
or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification
for a new trial.' 5
The Court found that the evidence in Agurs was not constitutionally
material.
116
Under Agurs, the Trombetta court held that the due process duty to
preserve evidence "must be limited to evidence that might be expected to
play a significant role in the suspect's defense."' " According to
Trombetta, the Agurs standard of constitutional materiality requires that
evidence "both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the
evidence was destroyed, and also be of such a nature that the defendant
111. Id. at 98-100.
112. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). TheAgurs court found that the Brady rule of disclosure applies in
three different situations, each involving the post-trial discovery of information known to the
prosecution but not to the defense, and each requiring a different standard of materiality. 427
U.S. at 103. The first type of information is undisclosed evidence that indicates that the prose-
cution's case included testimony which it knew or should have known was perjured. Id. The
evidence is material if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony- could have
affected the judgment of the jury. Id. The second category is specific information requested by
the defense before trial which has not been disclosed by the prosecution. Id. at 104. TheAgurs
court did not expressly identify the appropriate materiality standard in this situation, but
noted that "implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence
might have affected the outcome of the trial." Id. The third kind of evidence is undisclosed
exculpatory evidence possessed by the prosecution but not requested by the defense. This was
the situation the Court faced in Agurs. To be material in this context, the additional evidence
must create a reasonable doubt about guilt that did not otherwise exist. Id. at 112-13.
113. 427 U.S. at 109-10.
114. Id. at 112.
115. Id. at 112-13.
116. Id. at 113-14.
117. 104 S. Ct. at 2534.
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would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably
available means."' 18 Neither condition was met in Trombetta." 9
In determining that the respondents had not met the first require-
ment, the Court recognized the established reliability and accuracy of the
intoxilyzer: "The materiality of breath samples is directly related to the
reliability of the Intoxilyzer itself."' 20 The more reliable the device, the
less likely it is that preserved samples would have exculpatory value, 2 '
or, to use the language of Hitch, the less likely a defendant could show a
reasonable possiblity that the evidence would be favorable on the issue of
guilt or innocence. A showing that preserved samples "might conceiva-
bly have contributed to respondent's defenses"' 122 does not meet the first
requirement of constitutional materiality.
The Trombetta respondents also failed to establish the second re-
quirement, that no comparable evidence be reasonably available to the
defense. The Court noted that, even without preserved breath samples,
there are several ways to impeach intoxilyzer results, including faulty
calibration, extraneous interference with machine measurements, and op-
erator error. "Respondents were perfectly capable of raising these issues
without resort to preserved breath samples."'1
23
Under Trombetta, therefore, the duty to preserve evidence is limited
to evidence that meets the standard of constitutional materiality. To in-
voke sanctions for the good faith destruction or loss of evidence, a de-
fendant must show both that the evidence possessed an exculpatory value
that was apparent before it was destroyed or lost, and that he cannot
obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.
IV. The Viability of Hitch after Trombetta
Although the Trombetta Court did not expressly pass judgment on
Hitch, it discussed Hitch in a footnote:
Relying on ... Brady v. Maryland... and Giglio v. United States
..., the California Supreme Court concluded that the Due Process
Clause is implicated when a State intentionally destroys evidence
that might have proved favorable to a criminal defendant. The
Hitch decision was noteworthy in that it extrapolated from Brady's
disclosure requirement an additional constitutional duty on the
part of prosecutors to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence.'
24
118. Id. These materiality criteria were not articulated in Agurs. See supra notes 110-116
and accompanying text.
119. Id. Trombetta was reversed and remanded to the California Court of Appeal for fur-
ther proceedings not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. See infra note 127.
120. Id. at 2534 n.10.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2534.
123. Id. at 2535.
124. Id. at 2531-32 n.5 (citations omitted).
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Hitch now must be read in light of this comment by the United
States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court appeared implicitly to reject
the Hitch materiality standard when it articulated the more restrictive
first requirement of constitutional materiality, that evidence possess an
exculpatory value that was apparent before it was destroyed. The
Court's comment in the Trombetta footnote also raises the question of
whether the Court indirectly has criticized Hitch for extrapolating a con-
stitutional duty exceeding the requirements of Brady v. Maryland, which
the Trombetta Court expressly affirmed as the constitutional touchstone.
The Trombetta standard is significantly narrower than the Hitch
standard. Under Hitch, a defendant must show only a reasonable possi-
bility that the unavailable evidence would have been favorable. Under
Trombetta, the defendant must show that the evidence possessed an ex-
culpatory value that was apparent before it was destroyed and that com-
parable evidence is not reasonably available. While Trombetta's first
requirement, standing alone, could be interpreted as refining or limiting
Hitch's reasonable possibility standard, Trombetta's second requirement
is a significant addition to the Hitch standard. Together the Trombetta
requirements place a much greater evidentiary burden on the defendant
than did Hitch by requiring a defendant to show (1) that the evidence
had exculpatory value that was apparent before it was destroyed and (2)
that other means are not reasonably available to him to accomplish the
purpose for which the unavailable evidence was sought.
If Hitch implemented a federal due process standard, as the Court of
Appeal contended in Trombetta, 125 the Supreme Court's decision clearly
overturned it. Under Trombetta, the Fourteenth Amendment does not
require that the prosecution preserve evidence when a defendant estab-
lishes only a reasonable possibility that it would be favorable. The fed-
eral due process duty to preserve evidence arises only on a much greater
showing by a defendant that the evidence would have played a significant
role in his defense. 126
In Trombetta, both the Court of Appeal and the United States
Supreme Court assumed that Hitch implemented a federal due process
standard.' 27 Despite these assumptions, however, it is not clear whether
125. 142 Cal. App. 3d at 143, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 322. See infra note 127.
126. 104 S. Ct. at 2535. The California Supreme Court has expressly reserved the determi-
nation of whether Hitch survives Trombetta. See In re Michael L., 39 Cal. 3d 81, 86, 702 P.2d
222, 225, 216 Cal. Rptr. 140, 143 (1985). However, given the significant difference between the
Trombetta and Hitch standards of materiality, the court's reservation of the determination
appears merely to postpone the inevitable determination that Hitch does not survive. At least
one Court of Appeal has not hesitated to state that Trombetta is now the standard in Califor-
nia. See People v. Tierce, 165 Cal. App. 3d 256, 262-63, 211 Cal. Rptr. 325, 329 (1985).
127. See 142 Cal. App. 3d at 143, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 322 ("[Tihe Hitch rule implements a
federal due process standard."); 104 S. Ct. at 2531 n.5 (stating that the Hitch rule is an extra-
polation of federal due process decisions). On remand, No. A016358 (Cal. App., 1st Dist. Div.
4 filed Oct. 31, 1985), the California Court of Appeal, confronted directly with the question
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Hitch established a federal due process duty.12 8 In Hitch, the California
Supreme Court relied heavily on both federal and California decisions. 29
In addition, the reasonable possibility standard applied in Hitch arose in
whether Hitch rested on the federal or state due process clause, People v. Trombetta, No.
A016358, slip op. at 1, 4 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Div. 4 fied Oct. 31, 1985), reiterated its earlier
assertion that Hitch was indeed based on the federal Due Process Clause. Id. at 7. Recogniz-
ing that the Hitch opinion itself did not specifically refer to either the state or federal constitu-
tion, the Court of Appeal noted that the Hitch court had initiated its analysis with a review of
the federal due process cases, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). People v. Trombetta, No. A016358, slip op. at 5 (Cal. App. 1st
Dist. Div. 4 filed Oct. 31, 1985). The court asserted that in later looking to the materiality
standard developed in the California informer cases, the Hitch court "was not invoking the
state Constitution independently in support of the underlying duty to preserve the evidence,
but rather, in the absence of any relevant federal precedent, was applying what it believed the
proper standard to be." Id. at 6. The Court of Appeal based its assertion in part on dictum in
In re Michael L., 39 Cal. 3d 81, 702 P.2d 222, 216 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1985), that Hitch was based
on the federal Due Process Clause. Id. at 85-86. The Court of Appeal did not mention that in
Chief Justice Bird's strong dissent in Michael L., she emphasized that Hitch rested on in-
dependent state grounds. Id. at 101 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). In addition, the Court of Appeal
rejected the argument put forth by amicus curiae that the Hitch materiality standard had be-
come so imbedded in California law that it now constituted independent state grounds. The
court was not persuaded to accept in the lost evidence context the assertion by another Court
of Appeal that the reasonable possibility standard, as applied in the witness-informer context,
had become a "California doctrine of independent existence." People v. Trombetta, No.
A016358 slip op. at 7 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Div. 4 filed Oct. 31, 1985) (quoting from Cordova v.
Superior Court, 148 Cal. App. 3d 177, 184, 195 Cal. Rptr. 758, 761 (1983)).
The Court of Appeal concluded, therefore, that the federal due process standard of mate-
riality set forth in California v. Trombetta was the appropriate test to apply in the case before
it. People v. Trombetta, slip op. at 8 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Div. 4 Oct. 31, 1985).
Given the conclusion reached in this note that Hitch is no longer viable under either the
federal or state Due Process Clause, see infra notes 131-133 and accompanying text, the Court
of Appeal's assertion that Hitch implemented a federal standard foreclosed the one remaining
option available to it. If the court had determined that Hitch rested on independent state
grounds, it would remain a viable rule in prosecutions for offenses committed before June 9,
1982, the effective date of Proposition 8. See People v. Smith, 34 Cal. 3d 251, 262, 667 P.2d
149, 154, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692, 697 (1983); see supra note 74. The offenses in Trombetta oc-
curred before June 9, 1982.
128. In her dissent in a recent case, Chief Justice Bird stated, "I believe it necessary to
emphasize that the duty-to-preserve principles announced in Hitch rest on independent state
grounds." In re Michael L., 39 Cal. 3d 81, 101, 702 P.2d 222, 235, 216 Cal. Rptr. 140, 153
(1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice concluded, therefore, that Hitch survived
Trombetta. Id. at 101-04, 702 P.2d at 235-37, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 153-55. She did not address
the viability of Hitch on independent state grounds after the effective date of Proposition 8,
however, noting that Proposition 8 did not apply to Michael L. because the offense occurred
before Proposition 8 was passed. Id. at 105 n.9, 702 P.2d at 238 n.9, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 156 n.9.
See People v. Smith, 34 Cal. 3d 251, 258, 667 P.2d 149, 152, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692, 695 (1983).
129. In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 487 P.2d 1234, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1971); People v.
Hunt, 4 Cal. 3d 231, 481 P.2d 205, 93 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1971); Price v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d
836, 463 P.2d 721, 83 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1970); Honore v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 162, 449
P.2d 169, 74 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1969); In re Lessard, 62 Cal. 2d 497, 399 P.2d 39, 42 Cal. Rptr.
583 (1965) (which relied on Brady); In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 387 P.2d 61, 35 Cal. Rptr.
293 (1963) (which relied on Brady); People v. MeShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802, 330 P.2d 33 (1958).
a line of unidentified informer cases independent of Brady v.
Maryland.
130
If Hitch was based on the California Due Process Clause,
131
Trombetta did not overrule it. As the United States Supreme Court em-
phasized in Trombetta: "State courts and legislatures, of course, remain
free to adopt more rigorous safeguards governing the admissibility of sci-
entific evidence than those imposed by the Federal Constitution." '132 But
Hitch fares no better on independent state grounds, because Proposition
8 eliminated independent state grounds as a basis for excluding evidence
in criminal trials.133 The ineluctable conclusion is that Hitch does not
survive after Trombetta under either the federal or California Due Pro-
cess Clause.
A. The Effect of Trombetta on the Hitch Cases
Applying the Trombetta standard to the facts of People v. Hitch134
compels the same conclusion as the Supreme Court reached in
Trombetta. Although the breathalyzer used in Hitch may be somewhat
less reliable than the intoxilyzer, it is still a reliable machine.135 Once
breath samples have been tested and have yielded unfavorable evidence,
they are unlikely to have any apparent exculpatory value. In addition,
comparable evidence, such as operator error or machine malfunction,
130. 12 Cal. 3d at 648, 527 P.2d at 366, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 14. See supra note 30. The
California informer cases in which the reasonable possibility standard developed relied heavily
on Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), in which the Supreme Court held that the
prosecution must disclose the identity of an informer whose testimony might be helpful to the
defense. Id. at 63-64. Independent of Roviaro, a California Court of Appeal had reached the
identical conclusion based on the California Constitution. People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal. App.
2d 435, 308 P.2d 821 (1957), relied on former article I, section 13 (now section 15) of the
California Constitution, and California Penal Code section 686 to hold that nondisclosure of
the informer's identity in the appropriate circumstances violates the principle that a defendant
shall be accorded a full opportunity to defend himself. Id. at 450, 308 P.2d at 830. Lawrence's
independence from Roviaro is noted in People v. Castiel, 153 Cal. App. 2d 653, 658, 315 P.2d
79, 82 (1957). More recently, a California Court of Appeal has asserted that the reasonable
possibility standard is independent of federal law:
While the early California cases stating the test of witness materiality in informer
cases did cite federal cases, California cases and other cases are also cited ....
Whatever its origin, the California rule of materiality, as it relates to informer
witnesses, has been thoroughly imbedded in California for a substantial period of
time .... It has, in effect and in practice, become a California doctrine of independ-
ent existence.
Cordova v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. App. 3d 177, 183-84, 195 Cal. Rptr. 758, 761 (1983)
(citations omitted).
131. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
132. 104 S. Ct. at 2535 n.12.
133. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
134. 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974).
135. For a comparison of the technical aspects of the breathalyzer and intoxilyzer, see
Harte, An Instrument for the Determination of Ethanol in Breath in Law-Enforcement Practice,
16 J. FORENSIC SCIENCES 493 (1971).
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was available in Hitch for impeachment purposes, just as it was in
Trombetta.136 On its facts, Hitch would not have met the Trombetta
standard. Accordingly, there appears to be no duty to preserve
breathalyzer breath samples that can be enforced by the exclusionary
rule.
In People v. Nation, 137 a rape case, a semen sample was collected but
not properly preserved. The sample was not tested to identify the blood
type of the rapist until after trial. Although some type B blood activity
was observed at that time, a more extensive test could not be performed
because the sample had deteriorated. 138 That test might have eliminated
approximately 80% of the males of the defendant's race as donors of the
semen sample. 139
The Nation defendant easily met the Hitch standard."4 Under
Trombetta, the defendant could have shown that the sample had an ex-
culpatory value that was apparent before it deteriorated, particularly in
light of the victim's uncertain identification of the defendant. 14 1 More-
over, no comparable evidence was reasonably available to the defendant
to show that he was not the donor of the semen sample. The defendant
in Nation most likely would have met his burden under Trombetta,
thereby successfully invoking the exclusionary rule.
In People v. Moore, 42 the defendant had been convicted of narcotics
violations and placed on probation. A condition of probation was regu-
lar urinalysis for the presence of narcotics. Three tests on one of the sam-
ples indicated the presence of PCP. At the subsequent probation
revocation hearing, the defendant's counsel requested the urine sample,
but found that it had been discarded.1
43
The Supreme Court found that Moore had met his burden under
Hitch."4 Under the Trombetta standard, he would have failed. The fact
that three tests had shown traces of PCP indicates that the urine sample
had no exculpatory value apparent before the sample was discarded. On
the contrary, it probably would have been inculpatory. Even if the de-
fendant had met the first requirement, he could not have shown that
comparable evidence was not reasonably available. As in Trombetta,
other means of impeaching the test results existed, including challenging
the general reliability of the test, the competence of the chemist, or the
care with which the specific analyses had been performed.
136. 104 S. Ct. at 2535.
137. 26 Cal. 3d 169, 604 P.2d 1053, 161 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1980).
138. Id. at 173, 604 P.2d at 1055, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
139. Id. at 176, 604 P.2d at 1055, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
140. Id. at 177, 604 P.2d at 1055, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
141. Id.
.42. 34 Cal. 3d 215, 666 P.2d 419, 193 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1983).
143. Id. at 218, 666 P.2d at 420, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
144. Id. at 223, 666 P.2d at 423, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
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In People v. Goss, 145 a tape of a conversation between the defendant
and a police officer was erased inadvertently. In a supplemental report
written after the erasure, the officer attributed several incriminating
statements to the defendant. The defendant denied having made the
statements and moved to suppress the officer's testimony. 1
46
Under Trombetta, the defendant might have been able to meet the
apparent exculpatory value requirement, although the tape, if available,
was as likely to be inculpatory as exculpatory. He would not have been
able to meet the second requirement, however, because comparable evi-
dence was reasonably available. The defendant could have attempted to
impeach the officer's credibility or memory of the taped conversation.
Conclusion
The Trombetta standard of materiality is now the rule under the
Fourteenth Amendment in cases of good faith loss or destruction of evi-
dence. Trombetta rejected the reasonable possibility standard as a fed-
eral due process requirement, in effect overruling Hitch and most of its
progeny. In adopting Propsition 8, the California electorate eliminated
use of the exclusionary rule based on independant state grounds. Conse-
quently, Hitch may no longer be used to invoke the exclusionary rule in
California under either Constitution.
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